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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summits are 
often billed as ‘landmark’ or ‘historic’ but the Warsaw 
summit on 8-9 July 2016 brought together the heads of 
state and government to consider some issues of true 
significance for the future of the alliance. Should it focus 
more on the threat posed by a revanchist Russia, or the 
instability in the Middle East and North Africa that is 
sending waves of migrants to Europe? What is the nature 
of ‘hybrid warfare’ and how can a defensive alliance such 
as NATO manage the new challenges to its members’ 
security? These and other questions demand responses 
that go far beyond the usual platitudes delivered at 
summit meetings. In addition, the Warsaw summit 
arrived on the heels of the UK decision to leave the 
European Union. Although this has no direct effect on 
NATO, it opens up the door to unpredictability in Europe 
that could have security implications. 
 
The purpose of this Policy Brief is to examine the results of 
the Warsaw summit and consider how they measure up to 
the challenges of the current security environment. It 
begins with a brief look at the issues confronting European 
security prior to the summit. It then outlines the summit’s 
main conclusions and considers how they might be built 
upon in future NATO summits to better ensure a stable 
European security environment.   
The Main Challenges to European Security 
At one level, there is a geographic nature to the challenges 
that creates a competition between devoting resources 
towards the Eastern or Southern frontiers. At another 
level, the alliance is torn between defending against 
traditional military threats and adjusting to new forms of 
conflict. Finally, NATO is faced with a resource challenge; 
after decades of cuts to military spending and a period of 
declining American attention and leadership, the alliance 
is under pressure to recapitalize itself. 
Russia’s seizure of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea has in some 
ways been a tremendous uniting factor among NATO 
members. While there were some doubts as to where the 
culpability fell in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, it was 
clear to all members that Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
opened a new era of territorial threats to the alliance. If 
Russia felt that it could get away with its actions in 
Ukraine, what was to stop it from attempting to chip away 
at the sovereignty and territory of former Soviet 
possessions such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? True, 
they have been NATO members for more than a decade, 
but that would simply provide Russia with a means for 
demonstrating the hollowness of the alliance if it could 
engage in actions that are provocative yet below the 
Executive Summary 
> The NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 came at a 
particularly challenging time when European 
security and stability faces threats from both the 
East and the South.   
> The heads of state and government of the NATO 
member states made some strong commitments 
that reaffirm the centrality of the transatlantic 
alliance, including a tangible military presence on 
the Eastern frontier of the alliance.  
> This is a good beginning, but the question remains 
if it is enough to truly deter additional Russian 
actions that could further destabilize the European 
security environment.   
> NATO should redouble its focus on its core 
competencies as a political-military alliance and 
make a stronger commitment to the security of its 
most vulnerable members that would act as a 
more powerful deterrent. 
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threshold at which other members are willing to risk 
military engagement.   
At the same time, the instability on the Southern frontier 
is of much greater immediate concern to many 
Mediterranean members. The instability and state failure 
across the Middle East and North Africa spawned waves of 
migrants that have overwhelmed the ability of NATO 
members such as Greece, Turkey and Italy to manage the 
flow. There is no sign that this will abate; even a political 
solution to the conflict in Syria would not stop the flow of 
migrants from sub-Saharan Africa that are taking 
advantage of the chaos in Libya to cross the 
Mediterranean in search of better lives.   
Russia’s actions in Ukraine also highlight the nature of 
‘hybrid warfare’ and the need for the alliance to prepare 
for conflict that involves a wide range of activities that 
often fall below the level of traditional military hostilities. 
This can include deceptive information operations, the use 
of ununiformed personnel in military and paramilitary 
operations (the ‘little green men’), cyber-operations, and 
other means of influence. Hybrid warfare is a catch-all 
term that may simply be a convenient shorthand for 
discussing a complex phenomenon rather than a truly new 
threat, but NATO is concerned enough to have stood up a 
unit designed to meet the challenge posed by such forms 
of pressure.  
Finally, the resource issue is critical to the overall 
discussion. If member states were able to maintain robust 
military infrastructures, the alliance would be better 
prepared to manage this wide range of challenges. But the 
reality is that defence budgets across NATO have fallen 
consistently since the Cold War and show little indication 
of rebounding. There is some indication of increased 
spending in some countries, but this comes on the heels of 
cuts of 15-30% over the past two decades.  
The Outcome of the Warsaw Summit  
The summit agenda was closely tied to the issues outlined 
above, and the final communiqué of the heads of state and 
government touches on a wide range of critical matters 
from NATO’s relations with Ukraine to its ongoing 
commitment in Afghanistan.  
Before going any further, it is necessary to note what these 
formal statements are and are not. Summit communiqués 
are bureaucratic documents arrived at by a consensus of 
the participants. Every word and phrase is subject to 
argument and discussion, so any particularly strong 
language or commitment to action represents a firm 
decision of the allies, or at least a commitment of those 
not in favour to remain silent in the face of a concerted 
effort by the other members to insert such language. This 
is the basic consensus rule that governs NATO actions and 
it is important to keep this in mind when reading a summit 
communiqué. It is not the product of the Secretary 
General, or the most powerful members of the alliance.  
Rather, it is a representation of the consensus of all 28 
members. Given the challenges mentioned earlier that 
pull the alliance in different directions, points of clear 
agreement in the communiqué signify bridges between 
the different national positions that can be built upon.  
Against this backdrop, the main points of the communiqué 
can be examined. The document devotes considerable 
attention to the relationship with Russia, both regarding 
the need to increase NATO’s deterrence capabilities and 
to maintain a reasonable relationship with Russia. It also 
reaffirms NATO’s commitment to building a security 
relationship with Ukraine, and the symbolism of the 
meetings the Ukrainian Prime Minister had with NATO 
leaders in Warsaw was not lost on Russia. NATO is 
committed to maintaining a rotational presence of US, 
Canadian, German and other member state armed forces 
in the states that border Russia. In addition, NATO’s 
ballistic missile defence system went operational during 
the summit. Although the system is not directed at 
countering a strategic strike by Russia, it was yet another 
symbolic move to demonstrate the alliance’s commitment 
to the Eastern members. 
The Southern flank of NATO also received a considerable 
amount of attention in the communiqué. It recognizes the 
threat of terrorism to all members of the alliance and its 
roots in failed and failing states in the Middle East. It 
condemns the government of Syria for its actions (and 
implicitly Russia for its support), affirms NATO’s support to 
Iraq’s government, and underlines the alliance’s resolve to 
contribute to stemming the migrant flow across the 
Mediterranean.   
Resource issues were also highlighted. The communiqué 
stresses that the alliance is making progress on reversing 
the long-term decline in defence spending. Five alliance 
members now spend at least 2% of GDP on defence, and 
10 are spending 20% of that on equipment or research and 
development. The centrepiece of much of NATO’s 
increased ability to project power is the Readiness Action 
Plan approved at the 2014 summit in Wales. The Warsaw 
summit pushed that agenda forward with some concrete 
measures including the creation of a very high readiness 
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force capable of deploying in 48-72 hours, a strategic plan 
for hybrid warfare, and increased attention to maritime 
forces, particularly in the Black and Baltic seas.   
Although the communiqué was particularly lengthy 
compared to previous summit communiqués, and not all 
relevant aspects can be commented on here, it is clear that 
the heads of state and government in Warsaw were trying 
to send a clear message on a number of fronts: first, that 
no one should question the resolve of the Alliance and its 
commitment to Article V, the “attack on one is an attack 
on all” clause that is at the heart of its deterrent power; 
second, that NATO is not reticent to name the threats to 
alliance security and is willing to bring resources to the 
table to counter them; and, third, that the alliance can 
maintain focus on more than one region and bring its 
unique capabilities to bear on a wide range of challenges 
at one time. 
Too Hot, Too Cold or Just Right? 
Summit communiqués are designed to send messages to 
both adversaries and allies. Thus the critical question is, 
did this one send the right message to both? Is it enough 
to deter Russia without provoking it? Do both Eastern and 
Southern members have increased confidence that the 
alliance is a credible means of ensuring their security?  
Have NATO members truly committed to resolving the 
defence budget shortfalls that have plagued the alliance 
for years?   
The most significant issue is deterring any further Russian 
encroachment on the sovereignty of its neighbours at this 
stage. To that end, NATO is placing forces in the front line 
states, but only a few thousand ground troops. There will 
be four brigades of approximately 1000 troops each, with 
the United States contributing one company to each 
brigade. Germany, the UK, Canada and the Baltic states 
will contribute the remaining forces and all will be 
stationed on a rotational rather than a permanent basis. 
Contrast this with the multiple divisions Russia routinely 
involves in exercises on the border with Poland and the 
Baltic states and the disparity becomes clear. Obviously a 
few thousand troops from NATO member countries would 
be completely overwhelmed should one of those exercises 
become an invasion, but theoretically they should act as 
the sort of ‘tripwire’ that a small number of US troops in 
West Berlin were during the Cold War. Those American 
military personnel were not expected to defend the city. 
Rather, their presence in any hostilities would guarantee a 
larger American response.   
It is not at all clear if this tripwire strategy is an effective 
deterrent in the current environment. Given US reluctance 
to provide serious military assistance to Ukraine after the 
Russian invasion, its reticence to take a leadership role in 
NATO's operation in Libya, and its willingness to abandon 
missile defence in Europe to further its strategic arms 
control aims with Russia, it is indeed far from clear if the 
United States has the same sort of commitment to 
European security it once did. True, the US announced a 
‘reassurance package’ that commits some additional 
resources to Europe, but that merely brings its presence 
back to where it was a few years ago. Rather than a 
tripwire that would ensure a massive American response 
to an invasion of the Baltic states, for example, Russia 
could come to the logical conclusion that those NATO 
troops could be bargaining chips if taken as hostages in a 
quick military action with overwhelming force. If 
deterrence is to work, it must be credible. The 
commitments made at Warsaw are a good start, but a 
more significant military presence on the ground, backed 
up by air power, would go a long way toward making 
NATO’s defence of its most vulnerable members truly 
credible.   
On the Southern frontier, NATO should make it clear that 
its role is necessarily limited by the mismatch between the 
nature of the challenges and the strengths of the alliance. 
Beyond assisting the EU and member states with border 
patrol through airborne and sea-based platforms, NATO is 
not the most appropriate forum for what is essentially a 
domestic security issue in Europe. The European Union 
would be a better institution to address this issue through 
improved intelligence coordination, common border 
control through FRONTEX, and other tools at its disposal. 
NATO is a political-military alliance, whereas the EU has a 
far broader remit best suited to addressing complex issues 
that impact on the domestic security of its members. 
However, there is a near universal acknowledgment that 
the limited nature of EU-NATO cooperation is problematic. 
It remains blocked by the so-called ‘participation problem’ 
involving Turkey and Cyprus. As a result, the summit 
communiqué only mentions EU-NATO cooperation briefly 
and has little to say about how it might be improved.  
NATO could conceivably act as a stabilizing force in some 
of the failing and failed states on the periphery of Europe, 
but there is no appetite for such actions given the 
exhaustion with Afghanistan and the highly volatile 
environments in Libya, Syria and elsewhere involving the 
fight against the ‘Islamic State’, which is responsible for 
terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in the past year. Even 
with a UN mandate and a more permissive environment, 
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few NATO members would be willing and able to commit 
boots on the ground in the Middle East or North Africa.   
This leads to the issue of defence budgets. The summit 
communiqué was correct to highlight the turnaround in 
defence spending, but it is a very small rise in an otherwise 
declining trend line. Defence spending is likely to continue 
to decline across the alliance, including in the US, for a 
variety of reasons. In the short term, weak economic 
growth, high unemployment and domestic spending 
pressures will impact on the European allies’ ability to 
spend more. In the longer term, all of the allies face 
budgetary stresses, such as those stemming from 
demography, forcing it to spend more to sustain their 
retired population with a shrinking taxable work force. 
Defence budgets are unlikely to grow in such a fiscal 
environment.   
All of this makes it critical that NATO focuses on what it 
does best and what is truly existential for it as a defensive 
alliance. The defence of the Eastern flank should be the 
central focus of NATO right now. This is not to say that 
other regions are not important, but it is the Eastern front 
line states that face a direct challenge. Should Russia 
conclude that it is worth the risk of a limited war to destroy 
the credibility of NATO, the alliance could face a choice 
between a war opposing nuclear powers or fracturing the 
most successful and longest lasting alliance in modern 
history. Credible deterrence backed by significant 
commitments could be the single most important factor in 
preserving a stable European security environment.   
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